Economic Analysis of Law
Professor Ben-Shahar
Autumn 2008
Course Materials
The course readings are from Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (7th Ed. 2007) and supplementary materials available on Chalk.
There are several reference sources in law-and-economics which you might find useful throughout the course and wish to consult on your own. Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (3rd ed. 2003) is an easy introductory book. Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law is highly recommended comprehensive treatise. Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics (along with its website http://www.cooterulen.com) is another popular textbook. In addition, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (1998) and The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (currently posted on the Web at http://allserv.rug.ac.be/~gdegeest/) include extensive surveys of a wide variety of topics.
Office Hours
My e-mail address is omri@uchicago.edu and my office is 604. Office hours are Thursday, 11:00am – 12:00pm. You are always welcome to e-mail me for an appointment, or stop by my office if I'm in, without an appointment. You are welcome to come and talk about any law and economics topic, even if not discussed in class.
Attendance and Participation
Class participation and attendance are encouraged. A student's positive contribution to class discussion will be influencial in grading decisions.
Readings
Reading assignments are listed in the syllabus. Unless otherwise announced in class, you should prepare the topic that follows the one most recently discussed. Please prepare item 1 for the first meeting on Sept 29.
Examination
The will be a final, 8-hour, take home exam.
Reading Assignments
1. Introductory Lecture
Posner, 10-16, 23-27
Problem: Efficient Theft
The Coase Theorem
Excerpts from Coase, The Problem of Social Cost (Katz, 69-79)
Excerpts from Cooter, The Cost of Coase (Katz, 165-170)
Problem: The Coase Theorem
Contract Law
A. Default Rules
Posner, 93-99
Excerpts from Ayres and Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts, 99 Yale L. J. (1989), pp. 87-104, available online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/796722
Excepts from Ben-Shahar & Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. L. Rev. (2006)
B. Contract Formation
Posner 101-103
Excerpts from Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance
ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
C. Precontractual liability
Excerpts from Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 33 J. Legal Studies 423 (2001)
D. Duress
Posner, 115-118
Excerpts from Bar-Gill & Ben-Shadow, Credible Coercion, 83 Texas Law Review (2005) and The Law of Duress and the Economics of Credible Threats, 33 J. Legal Stud. (2004)
E. Remedies
Posner 118-131
F. Disclosure
Posner, 111-114
G. Course of Dealings
Excerpts from Ben-Shahar, The Erosion of Rights By Past Breach, 1 Amer. L. Econ. Rev. 1(1999)
4. Tort Law
A. Basic Theory
Posner, 166-182
B. Causation
Posner, 183-188
Excerpts from Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, (2000), pp. 644-647, 653-657
C. Punitive Damages and Decoupling
Excerpts from Polinsky and Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. (1998), pp. 869, 887-896
Excerpts from Polinsky, Detrebling versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages
D. Insurance
Posner, 199-2004
E. Products Liability and Activity Levels
Posner, 182-183
Excerpts from Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics, (2003, 3rd Ed.), pp. 50-54, 113-117
F.
Information
Excerpts from Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication
5. Property Law
A. Private versus Common Property
Posner, 31-38, 65-68
Excerpts from Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights
B. Eminent Domain
Posner, 55-61
Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property
C. Intellectual Property
Posner, 38-46
6. The Criminal Law
A. The Economic Theory of Optimal Sanctions
Posner, 215-232
B. Victim Precautions and the Social Cost of Handguns
Posner, 239-240
Excerpts from Lott, More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun-Control Laws (1998), pp. 1-3, 10-11, 19-20, 51-56, 91-93
Excerpts from Ayres and Donohue, Nondiscretionary Concealed Weapons Laws: A Case Study of Statistics, Standards of Proof, and Public Policy, 1 Amer. L. & Econ. Rev. 436 (1999)
Handout: Lojack
C. Empirical Studies of the Crime Rate
Excerpts from Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics (2000, 3rd Ed.), pp. 473-477
Excerpts from Steven Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s, 18 J. Econ. Perspectives 163 (2004), available online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3216880
Excerpts from "Does Abortion Prevent Crime?" (Slate.Com dialogue between Steven Levitt and Steve Sailer, 1999)
7. Litigation
A. Settlement versus Litigation
Posner, 597-603
Excerpts from Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55 (1982)
B.
Frivolous Suits
Bebchuk, Suits with Negative Expected Value, 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 551-554
C. Plea Bargaining
Posner, 607-610
Excerpts from Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners' (Plea Bargain) Dilemma
D. The Value of Legal Advice
Shavel, Legal Advice, 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics & the Law,
(1998), pp. 516-520
Excerpts from Gilson and Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509
(1994), pp. 514-519, 524-533
Problem: Legal Advice
8. Topics in Jurisprudence
A. Efficiency versus Redistributive Goals
(i) The basic argument
Excerpts from Kaplow and Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667 (1994)
(ii) The "Behavioral Economics" response
Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules,
51 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1653 (1998)
B. Rulemaking
Posner, 583-592
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