ANTITRUST LAW
Syllabus – Winter Quarter 2009
University of Chicago
Professor Daniel Crane
Assigned Text
Pitofsky, Goldschmid, Wood, Trade Regulation: Cases and Materials (5th ed).
2007 Supplement to Pitofsky, Goldschmid, Wood
Assigned Reading
- The goals of antitrust policy; common law antecedents (pp. 1-12, 169-172, 23-35)
- Statutory history of antitrust (pp. 35-51; handout on antitrust statutes)
- Early development of legal doctrine (pp. 51-66)
- Market power, market definition, and the Cellophane fallacy (pp. 128-165)
- Market definition – Grinnell and the Merger Guidelines (pp. 165-168, 172-191; Section 1.0-1.322 of the Merger Guidelines, pp. 1034-1042)
- Price-fixing and the per se rule (pp. 197-227)
- Characterization of joint action (pp. 228-249)
- The quick look approach (pp. 249-275)
- Professional associations (pp. 276-296)
- Horizontal non-price restraints (pp. 297-323)
- Boycotts and refusals to deal (pp. 331-345; 354-370; 378-386)
- Political "conspiracies" and Antitrust Federalism: The Noerr-Pennington doctrine (pp. 410-418; 443-449; pp. 450-455; 472-483)
- Proving collusion (pp. 490-505; Twombly, Supplement; 526-532)
- Facilitating practices (586-610; 551-584)
- Resale price maintenance (pp. 620-645; Leegin (Supplement)
- Vertical nonprice restraints (pp. 648-675)
- Vertical refusals to deal (pp. 679-711)
- Monopolization (pp. 722-750; Trinko (Supplement))
- Microsoft (pp. 765-812)
- Attempted monopolization (pp. 832-846)
- Predatory pricing (pp. 847-870; Weyerhaeuser (Supplement)
- Tying (pp. 876-903)
- More tying and bundled discounts (pp. 903-924) (3M v. LePages (Supplement))
- Exclusive dealing (pp. 935-953)
- Merger caselaw (pp. 964-975; 978-990; 994-1110)
The Merger Guidelines (pp. 1034-1065)
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