Tuesday, January 6, 2009

Antitrust Syllabus

ANTITRUST LAW


 

Syllabus – Winter Quarter 2009

University of Chicago


 

Professor Daniel Crane

(dcrane@yu.edu)


 


 


 

Assigned Text


 

    Pitofsky, Goldschmid, Wood, Trade Regulation: Cases and Materials (5th ed).


 

    2007 Supplement to Pitofsky, Goldschmid, Wood


 

Assigned Reading


 

  1. The goals of antitrust policy; common law antecedents (pp. 1-12, 169-172, 23-35)

  2. Statutory history of antitrust (pp. 35-51; handout on antitrust statutes)

  3. Early development of legal doctrine (pp. 51-66)

  4. Market power, market definition, and the Cellophane fallacy (pp. 128-165)

  5. Market definition – Grinnell and the Merger Guidelines (pp. 165-168, 172-191; Section 1.0-1.322 of the Merger Guidelines, pp. 1034-1042)

  6. Price-fixing and the per se rule (pp. 197-227)

  7. Characterization of joint action (pp. 228-249)

  8. The quick look approach (pp. 249-275)

  9. Professional associations (pp. 276-296)

  10. Horizontal non-price restraints (pp. 297-323)

  11. Boycotts and refusals to deal (pp. 331-345; 354-370; 378-386)

  12. Political "conspiracies" and Antitrust Federalism: The Noerr-Pennington doctrine (pp. 410-418; 443-449; pp. 450-455; 472-483)

  13. Proving collusion (pp. 490-505; Twombly, Supplement; 526-532)

  14. Facilitating practices (586-610; 551-584)


  15. Resale price maintenance (pp. 620-645; Leegin (Supplement)

  16. Vertical nonprice restraints (pp. 648-675)

  17. Vertical refusals to deal (pp. 679-711)

  18. Monopolization (pp. 722-750; Trinko (Supplement))

  19. Microsoft (pp. 765-812)

  20. Attempted monopolization (pp. 832-846)

  21. Predatory pricing (pp. 847-870; Weyerhaeuser (Supplement)

  22. Tying (pp. 876-903)

  23. More tying and bundled discounts (pp. 903-924) (3M v. LePages (Supplement))

  24. Exclusive dealing (pp. 935-953)

  25. Merger caselaw (pp. 964-975; 978-990; 994-1110)

The Merger Guidelines (pp. 1034-1065)

No comments: